Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
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Recommendations
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
Cites work
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology.
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(6)- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
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