Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
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Publication:909551
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3zbMath0694.90010OpenAlexW2005622293MaRDI QIDQ909551
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90003-3
Related Items (51)
Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation ⋮ Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms ⋮ Implementing action profiles when agents collude ⋮ Random extensive form games ⋮ Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Implementation in strong core by codes of rights ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Trade through endogenous intermediaries ⋮ Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents ⋮ Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Implementation via backward induction ⋮ A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees ⋮ Implementing a public project and distributing its cost ⋮ A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants ⋮ Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism ⋮ Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences ⋮ Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough ⋮ Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms ⋮ Natural implementation in public goods economies ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems ⋮ Bargaining and bargaining sets. ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
Cites Work
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- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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