Repeated implementation: a practical characterization

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.01.002zbMath1419.91268OpenAlexW2914918607MaRDI QIDQ1729682

Helmuts Āzacis, Péter Vida

Publication date: 28 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/118849/1/repeated_implement_Jan19.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrepeated gamesrepeated implementationsufficient and necessary conditionsdynamic monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

Cites Work

• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
• Complexity and repeated implementation
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Repeated implementation
• Virtual repeated implementation
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Efficient Repeated Implementation
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Incentives in Teams
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
• Repeated Nash implementation
• Computing Supergame Equilibria
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

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