Nash implementation without no-veto power
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Publication:952763
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.011zbMath1153.91394OpenAlexW2007218092MaRDI QIDQ952763
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.011
Related Items (25)
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in pure public good economies ⋮ Implementation in strong core by codes of rights ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Time and Nash implementation
Cites Work
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Exact implementation
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Voluntary implementation
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