Nash implementation without no-veto power
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Publication:952763
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.10.011zbMATH Open1153.91394OpenAlexW2007218092MaRDI QIDQ952763FDOQ952763
Authors: Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok 
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.011
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Cites Work
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
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- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Voluntary implementation
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
Cited In (37)
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Implementation with evidence
- Nash implementation in pure public good economies
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- Implementation of voting operators
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Rationalizable implementation
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- On the implementation of the median
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Time and Nash implementation
- Repeated Nash implementation
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
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