Maskin-monotonic scoring rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0835-6zbMATH Open1318.91065OpenAlexW2052311279MaRDI QIDQ2353699FDOQ2353699

Semih Koray, Battal Doğan

Publication date: 16 July 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12509

Recommendations

• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• Nash implementable domains for the Borda count

Cited In (4)

• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• Computational implementation
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

This page was built for publication: Maskin-monotonic scoring rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2353699)