On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90094-9zbMath0633.90005OpenAlexW2049052964MaRDI QIDQ1096516

Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90094-9

zbMATH Keywords

dual dominanceMaskin monotonicNash implementableunrestricted domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (19)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences ⋮ Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems

Cites Work

• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

This page was built for publication: On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions