Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00037-1zbMATH Open0929.91038WikidataQ127647245 ScholiaQ127647245MaRDI QIDQ1296478FDOQ1296478

Manabu Toda, Koichi Tadenuma

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Implementation in generalized matching problems
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilityNash equilibriaMaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result

Cited In (14)

• AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems
• Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
• An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

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