Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
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Publication:930486
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0272-XzbMATH Open1142.91694OpenAlexW2050536663MaRDI QIDQ930486FDOQ930486
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0272-x
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
Cited In (8)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
- Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Decentralized job matching
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
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