Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
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Publication:930486
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0272-xzbMath1142.91694OpenAlexW2050536663MaRDI QIDQ930486
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0272-x
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