Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
Cited in
(8)- Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
- Decentralized job matching
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
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