Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00037-1MaRDI QIDQ1296478zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Koichi Tadenuma, Manabu Toda

Publication date 2 August 1999

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilityNash equilibriaMaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Implementation in generalized matching problems
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems

Cited in

(16)

• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
• Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
• Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
• AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE
• Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex
• Unilateral stability in matching problems

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