Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems

DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0137-3MaRDI QIDQ2375893zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Koichi Tadenuma

Publication date 25 June 2013

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0137-3

zbMATH Keywords

minimal envypartnershipsolidaritystable matchingtwo-sided matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The replacement principle in economies with indivisible goods
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences

Cited in

(4)

• Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
• Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
• Optimization Methods for the Partner Units Problem
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems

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