Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems
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Publication:2375893
DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0137-3zbMath1275.91100OpenAlexW2170267033MaRDI QIDQ2375893
Publication date: 25 June 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0137-3
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