Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
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Publication:2569387
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.003zbMath1094.91050OpenAlexW2073003983MaRDI QIDQ2569387
M. Remzi Sanver, İpek Özkal-Sanver
Publication date: 27 October 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.003
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