Games of manipulation in marriage problems
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Publication:1369072
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0559zbMATH Open0894.90184OpenAlexW2010625201MaRDI QIDQ1369072FDOQ1369072
Publication date: 7 October 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/59e934a46ba31d0cd48a154a5e7bbc5a223dc004
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
Cited In (22)
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
- Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulation in Games
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- Dynamically stable matching
- The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
- A further note on the college admission game
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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