Games of manipulation in marriage problems

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0559MaRDI QIDQ1369072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tayfun Sönmez

Publication date 7 October 1997

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/59e934a46ba31d0cd48a154a5e7bbc5a223dc004

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmanipulationmarriage problemspreference revelation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value

Cited in

(24)

• Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
• Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker
• On the stability of couples
• Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5545491 (Why is no real title available?)
• The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4126946 (Why is no real title available?)
• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
• Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
• Manipulation in Games
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
• The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
• Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Dynamically stable matching
• The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
• A further note on the college admission game
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings

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