Recommendations
- Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
- The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
Cites work
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
Cited in
(24)- Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- On the stability of couples
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5545491 (Why is no real title available?)
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4126946 (Why is no real title available?)
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- Manipulation in Games
- Dynamically stable matching
- A further note on the college admission game
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
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