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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A competitive partnership formation process
- Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Evolutionary games and matching rules
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- On a characterization of stable matchings
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory
- Rankings and values for team games
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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Cited in
(8)- Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
- A note on cohabitation and marriage
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
- Stability of couples in a quantum dating market
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Measuring players' importance in basketball using the generalized Shapley value
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- LOVE AND APPEAL IN STANDARD COUPLES
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