On the stability of couples

DOI10.3390/G9030048zbMATH Open1418.91044OpenAlexW2874520070MaRDI QIDQ1630461FDOQ1630461

Authors: Tobias Hiller 

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030048

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zbMATH Keywords

team gamesmarriage market\(\chi\)-valuestability of couples

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The assignment game. I: The core
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
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• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A competitive partnership formation process
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Rankings and values for team games
• Evolutionary games and matching rules
• Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory
• The \(\chi\) value and team games

Cited In (8)

• Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
• A note on cohabitation and marriage
• Stability of couples in a quantum dating market
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
• Measuring players' importance in basketball using the generalized Shapley value
• Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
• LOVE AND APPEAL IN STANDARD COUPLES

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