scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363

zbMath0968.91516MaRDI QIDQ4369422

Marilda Sotomayor, Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 28 January 1998

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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