The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.002MaRDI QIDQ1995460zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacob D. Leshno, Bary S. R. Pradelski

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

informationprice discoveryconvergence timeassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(4)

• Memory Property in Heterogeneously Populated Markets
• Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
• Memory and markets
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

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