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Publication:3066116
zbMath1202.91141MaRDI QIDQ3066116
Elsie M. Knoer, Vincent P. Crawford
Publication date: 8 January 2011
Full work available at URL: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/CrawfordKnoer81EMT.pdf
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