Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.004MaRDI QIDQ308656zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp15_12.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumexisting tenantsgroup non-manipulabilitymaximum trademinimum equilibrium prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• House allocation with transfers
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions

Cites work

• A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
• Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with transfers
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
• On cores and indivisibility
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(2)

• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule

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