Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
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Publication:308656
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.004zbMATH Open1371.91115OpenAlexW2493106238MaRDI QIDQ308656FDOQ308656
Lars Ehlers, Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp15_12.pdf
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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Cited In (2)
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