Queue allocation of indivisible goods

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Publication:1338546

DOI10.1007/BF00183301zbMath0812.90034OpenAlexW1969400029MaRDI QIDQ1338546

Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183301




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