Counting houses of Pareto optimal matchings in the house allocation problem
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Abstract: Let with and be two sets. We assume that every element has a reference list over all elements from . We call an injective mapping from to a matching. A blocking coalition of is a subset of such that there exists a matching that differs from only on elements of , and every element of improves in , compared to according to its preference list. If there exists no blocking coalition, we call the matching an exchange stable matching (ESM). An element is reachable if there exists an exchange stable matching using . The set of all reachable elements is denoted by . We show [|E^*| leq sum_{i = 1,ldots, m}{leftlfloorfrac{m}{i}
ight
floor} = Theta(mlog m).] This is asymptotically tight. A set is reachable (respectively exactly reachable) if there exists an exchange stable matching whose image contains as a subset (respectively equals ). We give bounds for the number of exactly reachable sets. We find that our results hold in the more general setting of multi-matchings, when each element of is matched with elements of instead of just one. Further, we give complexity results and algorithms for corresponding algorithmic questions. Finally, we characterize unavoidable elements, i.e., elements of that are used by all ESM's. This yields efficient algorithms to determine all unavoidable elements.
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Cites work
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