Counting houses of Pareto optimal matchings in the house allocation problem

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Abstract: Let A,B with |A|=m and |B|=ngem be two sets. We assume that every element ainA has a reference list over all elements from B. We call an injective mapping au from A to B a matching. A blocking coalition of au is a subset A of A such that there exists a matching au that differs from au only on elements of A, and every element of A improves in au, compared to au according to its preference list. If there exists no blocking coalition, we call the matching au an exchange stable matching (ESM). An element binB is reachable if there exists an exchange stable matching using b. The set of all reachable elements is denoted by E. We show [|E^*| leq sum_{i = 1,ldots, m}{leftlfloorfrac{m}{i} ight floor} = Theta(mlog m).] This is asymptotically tight. A set EsubseteqB is reachable (respectively exactly reachable) if there exists an exchange stable matching au whose image contains E as a subset (respectively equals E). We give bounds for the number of exactly reachable sets. We find that our results hold in the more general setting of multi-matchings, when each element a of A is matched with ella elements of B instead of just one. Further, we give complexity results and algorithms for corresponding algorithmic questions. Finally, we characterize unavoidable elements, i.e., elements of B that are used by all ESM's. This yields efficient algorithms to determine all unavoidable elements.









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