Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
DOI10.1016/J.DISOPT.2014.09.002zbMATH Open1308.91117OpenAlexW2028349730MaRDI QIDQ2339842FDOQ2339842
Eva Potpinková, Dimitrios Magos, Pavlos Eirinakis, Katarina Cechlárová, Ioannis Mourtos, Tamás Fleiner
Publication date: 9 April 2015
Published in: Discrete Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disopt.2014.09.002
Recommendations
Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Matching models (91B68)
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Cited In (16)
- The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- On Pareto optimal balanced exchanges
- Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
- Solving the maximum popular matching problem with matroid constraints
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Counting houses of Pareto optimal matchings in the house allocation problem
- Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties
- Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting
- Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Algorithms and Computation
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
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