Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
DOI10.3934/jdg.2023001zbMath1517.90075OpenAlexW4323649682MaRDI QIDQ6107330
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023001
Pareto optimalitywater allocationgeneralized Nash equilibriumserial dictatorshipmany-to-many allocation
Noncooperative games (91A10) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Interactive solutions for the linear multiobjective transportation problem
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Assessing a set of additive utility functions for multicriteria decision- making, the UTA method
- Lexicographic orders and preference representation
- The noncooperative transportation problem and linear generalized Nash games
- On safe tractable approximations of chance constraints
- Computing all solutions of linear generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
- Non-cooperative games
- Solving linear generalized Nash equilibrium problems numerically
- Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money
- On the solution of the KKT conditions of generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- Multiattribute Utility Functions Satisfying Mutual Preferential Independence
- Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games
- Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Noncooperative Systems Based on Game Theory—Part I: Nash Equilibria
- Chance Constraints and Normal Deviates
- The Transportation-Location Problem
- Algorithms and Computation
- Robustness
- Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
