Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
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Publication:3088085
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5764830 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
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Cited in
(16)- Efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
- Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- Social welfare in one-sided matchings: random priority and beyond
- Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive
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