Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-22935-0_8zbMath1343.91023OpenAlexW2155808992MaRDI QIDQ3088085

Anand Bhalgat, Sanjeev Khanna, Deeparnab Chakrabarty

Publication date: 17 August 2011

Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/663

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (12)

Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem ⋮ Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive ⋮ Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design ⋮ Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions ⋮ Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management ⋮ Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule ⋮ Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship ⋮ Tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching ⋮ Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money ⋮ Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem ⋮ Size versus fairness in the assignment problem ⋮ A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching

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