Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money
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Publication:3088085
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-22935-0_8zbMath1343.91023MaRDI QIDQ3088085
Sanjeev Khanna, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Anand Bhalgat
Publication date: 17 August 2011
Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/663
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B68: Matching models
91B15: Welfare economics
Related Items
Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship, Size versus fairness in the assignment problem, Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money
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