Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-22935-0_8zbMATH Open1343.91023OpenAlexW2155808992MaRDI QIDQ3088085FDOQ3088085
Authors: Anand Bhalgat, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sanjeev Khanna 
Publication date: 17 August 2011
Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/663
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15) Matching models (91B68)
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Cited In (16)
- Efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
- Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- Social welfare in one-sided matchings: random priority and beyond
- Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive
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