Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-22935-0_8MaRDI QIDQ3088085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anand Bhalgat, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sanjeev Khanna

Publication date 17 August 2011

Published in Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/663

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5764830 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• Bounded Unpopularity Matchings
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Online vertex-weighted bipartite matching and single-bid budgeted allocations
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• Popular Matchings
• Popular Mixed Matchings
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• The Least-Unpopularity-Factor and Least-Unpopularity-Margin Criteria for Matching Problems with One-Sided Preferences

Cited in

(16)

• Efficiency of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching
• A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
• A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
• Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
• Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
• Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
• Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
• Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
• Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
• Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
• Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
• Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
• Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
• Social welfare in one-sided matchings: random priority and beyond
• Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive

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