Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.09.004zbMATH Open1368.91109OpenAlexW1844144191MaRDI QIDQ898694FDOQ898694

Authors: Antonio Miralles, Isa E. Hafalir 

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.004

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zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemsBoston mechanismmechanism designwelfare maximizationno transferspseudomarket

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Efficient compromising
• Matching through position auctions
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets

Cited In (8)

• A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Selecting a winner with external referees

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