Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.09.004MaRDI QIDQ898694zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Miralles, Isa E. Hafalir

Publication date 18 December 2015

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemsBoston mechanismmechanism designwelfare maximizationno transferspseudomarket

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
• Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
• Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
• Efficient compromising
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Matching through position auctions
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets

Cited in

(8)

• Selecting a winner with external referees
• A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers

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