Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
- Efficient compromising
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
- Matching through position auctions
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
Cited in
(8)- Selecting a winner with external referees
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
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