Selecting a winner with external referees
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Publication:6133347
Recommendations
- On Incentive Compatible Competitive Selection Protocol
- Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
- Equilibrium selection in information elicitation without verification via information monotonicity
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107164 (Why is no real title available?)
- A near-optimal mechanism for impartial selection
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- Efficient compromising
- Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices
- Impartial nomination correspondences
- Impartial nominations for a prize
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Optimal impartial selection
- Optimal voting rules
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Symmetry and impartial lotteries
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
Cited in
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