Selecting a winner with external referees

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105687zbMATH Open1521.91060OpenAlexW4381487447MaRDI QIDQ6133347FDOQ6133347

Francis Bloch, Marcin Dziubiński, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 18 August 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687

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zbMATH Keywords

ex post incentive compatibilityBayesian incentive compatibilitypeer selectionmechanism design without moneydominant strategy incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Efficient compromising
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
• Impartial nominations for a prize
• Impartial nomination correspondences
• Optimal Voting Rules
• A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection
• Symmetry and impartial lotteries
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
• Optimal Impartial Selection
• Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices

Cited In (1)

• Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification

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