A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_10zbMath1406.91101arXiv1407.8535OpenAlexW181649221MaRDI QIDQ2936981

Adrian Vetta, Serguei Norine, Nicolas Bousquet

Publication date: 7 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.8535

zbMATH Keywords

impartial selectionnumber of votesstrategy-proof elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (7)

Optimal Impartial Selection ⋮ Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices ⋮ Symmetry and impartial lotteries ⋮ \textsc{PeerNomination}: a novel peer selection algorithm to handle strategic and noisy assessments ⋮ Selecting a winner with external referees ⋮ Optimal impartial correspondences ⋮ Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees

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