Symmetry and impartial lotteries
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Publication:894602
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.007zbMATH Open1347.91133OpenAlexW1473750384MaRDI QIDQ894602FDOQ894602
Authors: Andrew Mackenzie 
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.007
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Cites Work
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- A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection
Cited In (13)
- Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
- Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices
- Optimal impartial correspondences
- Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
- Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
- A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem
- Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
- Selecting a winner with external referees
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