An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
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Publication:2308795
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Cites work
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes
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- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
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- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
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- House allocation with existing tenants
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3394154 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impartial division of a dollar
- Impartial nomination correspondences
- Impartial nominations for a prize
- Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices
- Incentives in Teams
- Kidney Exchange
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- On 64%-Majority Rule
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal impartial selection
- Picking the winners
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Cited in
(14)- Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
- How to choose a fair delegation?
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
- Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders
- Selecting a winner with external referees
- On reaching social consent
- Optimal impartial correspondences
- Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion
- Deterministic impartial selection with weights
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
- Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies
- Aggregating incomplete rankings
- Optimal impartial correspondences
- Impartial selection under combinatorial constraints
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