How to choose a fair delegation?

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01312-XMaRDI QIDQ2074063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Burak Can, Péter Csóka, Emre Ergin

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01312-x

zbMATH Keywords

Kemeny distancestrategy-proofnessconflict managementaggregation rulescommittee selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3240929 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
• Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions
• Characterizations of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Error detecting and error correcting codes
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria

Cited in

(1)

• Representative committees of peers

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