Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1374816
DOI10.1007/s003550050083zbMath0888.90008OpenAlexW2103589732MaRDI QIDQ1374816
Publication date: 11 December 1997
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050083
Related Items (15)
1998–1999 Winter Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic ⋮ Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population ⋮ Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ Quasi-stationary social welfare functions ⋮ Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games ⋮ Superset-robust collective choice rules ⋮ On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions ⋮ Anonymity in large societies ⋮ The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population ⋮ An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave ⋮ Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules
This page was built for publication: Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
