Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
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Publication:1374816
DOI10.1007/S003550050083zbMATH Open0888.90008OpenAlexW2103589732MaRDI QIDQ1374816FDOQ1374816
Authors: H. Reiju Mihara 
Publication date: 11 December 1997
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050083
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- Intergenerational equity and infinite-population ethics: a survey
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