Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
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Publication:2460080
Consider a social welfare function à la Arrow (the social preference is a complete preorder). If this function satisfies the Pareto principle, non-dictatorship and universality (no restrictions on individual complete preorders), some weak form of independence disallows both anonymity and neutrality.
Recommendations
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- Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives
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Cited in
(16)- Welfarism, IIA and Arrovian constitutional rules
- A foundation for Pareto aggregation
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
- Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
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