Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy

DOI10.1093/LOGCOM/EXN010MaRDI QIDQ3632766zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan Perote-Peña, Ashley Piggins

Publication date 12 June 2009

Published in Journal Of Logic And Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exn010

zbMATH Keywords

fuzzy preferencesmanipulationsocial welfare functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

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