Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences
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Publication:2268892
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 855012 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5068644 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: A theoretic Arrow-like approach
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- Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations
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- L-fuzzy sets
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy
- On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions
- On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
- Rationality and aggregation of preferences in an ordinally fuzzy framework
- Social choice and Lukasiewicz logic
- Social choice and individual values
- Soft sets: An ordinal formulation of vagueness with some applications to the theory of choice
- Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
- The structure of fuzzy preferences: social choice implications
- Transitivity and fuzzy preferences.
Cited in
(6)- Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy
- Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules
- Arrow's theorem and max-star transitivity
- Fuzzy Black's median voter theorem: examining the structure of fuzzy rules and strict preference
- On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
- On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions
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