Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0405-5zbMATH Open1201.91056OpenAlexW2058722356MaRDI QIDQ2268892FDOQ2268892

Conal Duddy, Juan Perote-Peña, Ashley Piggins

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0405-5

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES

Cited In (5)

• Arrow's theorem and max-star transitivity
• Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy
• On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
• Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules
• Fuzzy Black's median voter theorem: examining the structure of fuzzy rules and strict preference

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