Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives (Q2460080)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5211623
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| English | Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5211623 |
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Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives (English)
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14 November 2007
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Consider a social welfare function à la Arrow (the social preference is a complete preorder). If this function satisfies the Pareto principle, non-dictatorship and universality (no restrictions on individual complete preorders), some weak form of independence disallows both anonymity and neutrality.
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0.86527497
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0.84322286
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0.8424237
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0.8420656
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0.83936733
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0.8364148
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