Weak independence and the Pareto principle
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Publication:331709
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0960-5zbMATH Open1392.91049OpenAlexW2346611449MaRDI QIDQ331709FDOQ331709
Authors: Susumu Cato 
Publication date: 27 October 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0960-5
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Cites Work
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- Semiorders and collective choice
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- Democratic preference functions
- The free triple assumption
- A note on social choice theory without the Pareto principle
- Weak independence and veto power.
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
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- t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
- A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
- Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
- Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
- Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
- Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
- Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
Cited In (7)
- The number of times an anonymous rule violates independence in the \(3 \times 3\) case
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
- When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto?
- Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
- Weak independence and veto power.
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
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