Weak independence and the Pareto principle

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0960-5zbMATH Open1392.91049OpenAlexW2346611449MaRDI QIDQ331709FDOQ331709

Authors Susumu Cato 

Publication date 27 October 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0960-5

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principleArrovian frameworkweak independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
• A note on social choice theory without the Pareto principle
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
• Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• Democratic preference functions
• Domain conditions in social choice theory
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Information and preference aggregation
• Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
• Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
• Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
• Semiorders and collective choice
• Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
• Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
• Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
• Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
• The free triple assumption
• Twitching weak dictators
• Weak independence and veto power.
• Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
• t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off

Cited In (12)

• The number of times an anonymous rule violates independence in the \(3 \times 3\) case
• Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
• A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
• On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence
• Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
• About one generalization of weak Condorcet principle
• When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto?
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• Weak independence and veto power.
• Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence
• Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
• Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives

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