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Cites work
- A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
- A note on social choice theory without the Pareto principle
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
- Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- Democratic preference functions
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Information and preference aggregation
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
- Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
- Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
- Semiorders and collective choice
- Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
- Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- The free triple assumption
- Twitching weak dictators
- Weak independence and veto power.
- Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
- t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
Cited in
(12)- The number of times an anonymous rule violates independence in the \(3 \times 3\) case
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
- On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence
- Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
- About one generalization of weak Condorcet principle
- When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto?
- Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
- Weak independence and veto power.
- Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
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