Recommendations
Cited in
(35)- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
- Acyclic choice and group veto
- From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
- The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
- F-decomposable social aggregation rules and acyclic choice
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
- A note on the core of voting games
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- Product filters, acyclicity and suzumura consistency
- A rote on impossibility theorems and seniority rules
- Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
- Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
- Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate
- Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
- On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- Limits of acyclic voting
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- Conditions on social-preference cycles
- A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
- Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
- Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
This page was built for publication: Acyclic social choice from finite sets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1897506)
