Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules

DOI10.1007/BF00452882MaRDI QIDQ800196zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edward W. Packel

Publication date 1984

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00452882

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriaprefilteracyclic majoritymultiple-valued Paretian social choice rulepreventing sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202054 (Why is no real title available?)
• A power rule for social choice
• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions

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