Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
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Publication:800196
DOI10.1007/BF00452882zbMath0549.90003MaRDI QIDQ800196
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00452882
prefilter; strong equilibria; acyclic majority; multiple-valued Paretian social choice rule; preventing sets
91B14: Social choice
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Cites Work
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