Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules

DOI10.1007/BF00452882zbMATH Open0549.90003OpenAlexW2246577453MaRDI QIDQ800196FDOQ800196

Authors: Edward W. Packel 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00452882

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zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriaprefilteracyclic majoritymultiple-valued Paretian social choice rulepreventing sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms

Cited In (4)

• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A power rule for social choice

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