Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
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Publication:1170105
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90030-0zbMath0496.90006MaRDI QIDQ1170105
Edward W. Packel, Donald G. Saari
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/401.pdf
equilibrium conditions; ultrafilters; strategic voting; collections of decisive sets; prefilters filters; social choice mechanisms; strategy selecting functions
91B14: Social choice
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Cites Work
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- The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
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