Conditions on social-preference cycles
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Publication:497476
DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9zbMath1378.91077OpenAlexW1988375643MaRDI QIDQ497476
Publication date: 24 September 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9
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