Conditions on social-preference cycles
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Cites work
- A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
- A characterization of the Copeland solution
- A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
- Acyclic choice and group veto
- Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
- Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Condorcet's paradox
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- Social choice and individual values
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
Cited in
(6)- A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
- Remarks on the Condorcet's paradox
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3914021 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Fishburn social choice function
- Cycles and social choice. The true and unabridged story of a most protean paradox
- A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
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