A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.002zbMath1132.91404OpenAlexW2066324448MaRDI QIDQ2469865

Thomas Schwartz

Publication date: 11 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

cyclessocial choiceLiberal Paradoximpossibility theoremsvoting paradoxCondorcet

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic ⋮ Conditions on social-preference cycles

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

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