Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic
From MaRDI portal
Publication:649143
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0580-ZzbMath1235.91063OpenAlexW2054363115MaRDI QIDQ649143
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0580-z
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives
- A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
- The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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