The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
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Publication:3258622
DOI10.2307/1910256zbMath0086.13802OpenAlexW2331984893MaRDI QIDQ3258622
Publication date: 1957
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1910256
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