First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation
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Publication:373021
DOI10.1007/s10992-012-9240-8zbMath1285.91041MaRDI QIDQ373021
Publication date: 21 October 2013
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9240-8
first-order logic; automated reasoning; social choice theory; preference aggregation; axiomatisability
91B12: Voting theory
03B35: Mechanization of proofs and logical operations
91B14: Social choice
03B80: Other applications of logic
Related Items
Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic, Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Natural deduction for modal logic of judgment aggregation, Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover, Arrow's decisive coalitions
Uses Software
Cites Work
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