Reasoning about social choice functions

DOI10.1007/S10992-011-9189-ZzbMATH Open1253.03044arXiv1102.3341OpenAlexW3101370440MaRDI QIDQ652736FDOQ652736

Nicolas Troquard, M. J. Wooldridge, Wiebe van der Hoek

Publication date: 15 December 2011

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1102.3341

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicsocial choice theorypreferencesknowledge representationstrategy-proofnessstrategic ability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)

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Cited In (14)

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• Algorithmic Decision Theory Meets Logic
• Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
• Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks
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• Social choice and Lukasiewicz logic
• Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
• Arrow's decisive coalitions
• Social choice function with subordinate relations as one variable
• Rational decision principle and social choice function
• Natural deduction for modal logic of judgment aggregation
• First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic

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