Abstract: We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.
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(18)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7431114 (Why is no real title available?)
- Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic
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- Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
- Reasoning about strategic voting in modal logic quickly becomes undecidable
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- Social choice function with subordinate relations as one variable
- Natural deduction for modal logic of judgment aggregation
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- Applications of logic in social choice theory (invited talk)
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