On strongly consistent social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-CMaRDI QIDQ687046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vladimir I. Danilov, Aleksandr I. Sotskov

Publication date 2 December 1993

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-c

zbMATH Keywords

eliminable blockingselimination schemestrong equilibriumstrongly consistent social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

The paper analyses strongly consistent social choice functions (SCF) i.e., SCF's which yield a strong equilibrium for every preference profile of individuals. Similar to the elimination procedure introduced by \textit{B. Peleg} [Econometrica 46, 153-161 (1978; Zbl 0373.90002)] the paper introduces the key notion of an elimination scheme. A distribution of coalitions power (a blocking) is said to be eliminable, if an elimination scheme exists for every preference profile. In case a blocking is eliminable, each selector of its core correspondence is shown to be a strongly consistent SCF. Several characterizations and examples of eliminable blockings are provided.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(13)

• Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives
• On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions
• Vetoing in social choice with blockings
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
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• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Reasoning about social choice functions
• On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

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