On strongly consistent social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-CMaRDI QIDQ687046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vladimir I. Danilov, Aleksandr I. Sotskov

Publication date 2 December 1993

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-c

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumeliminable blockingselimination schemestrongly consistent social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060932 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079106 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions

Cited in

(13)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3989041 (Why is no real title available?)
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
• On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reasoning about social choice functions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795159 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• Vetoing in social choice with blockings
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2156838 (Why is no real title available?)
• On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem

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