scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795159

zbMATH Open0830.90005MaRDI QIDQ4845308FDOQ4845308

Authors: Stefano Vannucci 

Publication date: 30 January 1996

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

stable effectivity functionsagenda manipulation problemcore correspondencesdramatic improvements pay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (1)

• Title not available (Why is that?)

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