Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium
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Publication:5111113
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_17zbMath1443.91136OpenAlexW2786896287MaRDI QIDQ5111113
Bezalel Peleg, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp717.pdf
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Cites Work
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