Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_17MaRDI QIDQ5111113zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp717.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondencesstrong equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
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• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(9)

• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Self-enforcement, heterogeneous agents, and long-run survival
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795159 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970203 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms

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