Weakly implementable social choice rules

DOI10.1007/BF00134093MaRDI QIDQ1200530zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134093

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibriaminimum path independenceminimum resolutenessmultivalued social choice rulespartial implementabilitypervasive veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• On combining implementable social choice rules
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
• Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• The strategy-proof social choice functions
• Weak path independence

Cited in

(7)

• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970203 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795159 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• On combining implementable social choice rules
• Weak implementation

This page was built for publication: Weakly implementable social choice rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1200530)