Weakly implementable social choice rules
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Publication:1200530
DOI10.1007/BF00134093zbMATH Open0766.90003OpenAlexW2029961501MaRDI QIDQ1200530FDOQ1200530
Larry Samuelson, Taradas Bandyopadhyay
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134093
strong Nash equilibriaminimum path independenceminimum resolutenessmultivalued social choice rulespartial implementabilitypervasive veto power
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