Weakly implementable social choice rules
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Publication:1200530
DOI10.1007/BF00134093zbMath0766.90003MaRDI QIDQ1200530
Larry Samuelson, Taradas Bandyopadhyay
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
strong Nash equilibria; minimum path independence; minimum resoluteness; multivalued social choice rules; partial implementability; pervasive veto power
91B14: Social choice
Cites Work
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