Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
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Publication:1066782
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90049-3zbMath0578.90003OpenAlexW2080909868MaRDI QIDQ1066782
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90049-3
Related Items (6)
Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle ⋮ Sequential path independence and social choice ⋮ Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules ⋮ Rationality, path independence, and the power structure ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
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- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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