Rationality, path independence, and the power structure

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7MaRDI QIDQ1820656zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date 1986

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7

zbMATH Keywords

almost dictatorshipdictatorshipoligarchyparadigm operators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

In the framework of Arrow paradigm operators are investigated by which a profile of weak orders specified on the set of all alternatives and a presented subset of alternatives are transformed in a choice from this subset. Characteristic conditions are given which are compatible without implying dictatorship or oligarchy. At the same time it is stated that in these conditions an almost dictatorship is necessarily existing, which is related to essential infringement of voters' symmetry.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(11)

• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• Twitching weak dictators
• Weakly implementable social choice rules
• Path independence in serial-parallel data processing
• Power of enforcement and dictatorship
• Limits on power and rationality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50415 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
• Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
• The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
• Sequential path independence and social choice

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