Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
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Publication:1820656
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7zbMATH Open0614.90009OpenAlexW2055633707MaRDI QIDQ1820656FDOQ1820656
Authors: Taradas Bandyopadhyay 
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Weak path independence
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
Cited In (10)
- Power of enforcement and dictatorship
- Twitching weak dictators
- Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
- Sequential path independence and social choice
- Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
- Limits on power and rationality
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Path independence in serial-parallel data processing
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