Rationality, path independence, and the power structure

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7MaRDI QIDQ1820656zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date 1986

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90079-7

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorshipoligarchyalmost dictatorshipparadigm operators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
• Functional local operators in voting theory. I
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions
• Functional local operators in voting theory. II
• Arrovian aggregation models

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
• On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social choice and individual values
• Weak path independence

Cited in

(11)

• Power of enforcement and dictatorship
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50415 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
• Twitching weak dictators
• The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
• Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
• Sequential path independence and social choice
• Limits on power and rationality
• Weakly implementable social choice rules
• Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
• Path independence in serial-parallel data processing

This page was built for publication: Rationality, path independence, and the power structure

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1820656)