Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
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Publication:1820656
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Social choice and individual values
- Weak path independence
Cited in
(11)- Sequential path independence and social choice
- Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
- Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
- Path independence in serial-parallel data processing
- Power of enforcement and dictatorship
- Limits on power and rationality
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50415 (Why is no real title available?)
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Twitching weak dictators
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