Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
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Publication:649146
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(11)- A characterization for procedural choice based on dichotomous preferences over criteria
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4008061 (Why is no real title available?)
- Collective choice procedures
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116251 (Why is no real title available?)
- Power in Decisions Among Multiple Alternatives
- Selectivity in hierarchical social systems
- Integrating social power into the decision-making of cognitive agents
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- The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
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