Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
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Publication:649146
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0583-9zbMATH Open1235.91059OpenAlexW2064864685MaRDI QIDQ649146FDOQ649146
Authors: Taradas Bandyopadhyay 
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0583-9
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Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Collective choice procedures
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Power in Decisions Among Multiple Alternatives
- Selectivity in hierarchical social systems
- Integrating social power into the decision-making of cognitive agents
- Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
- The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
- A power rule for social choice
- Control of social choice systems
- A characterization for procedural choice based on dichotomous preferences over criteria
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